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Options for reform of Commonwealth and State
governance responsibilities for the Australian
health system
The purpose of this paper is to provide advice on options for governance reform of
Commonwealth-state responsibilities for the Australian health system, for consideration by the
NHHRC. The service design and governance principles published by the Commission in
Beyond the Blame Game, along with the concept of single accountability, have been used as
a framework for our thinking.

The task
We were asked to address two main questions:
•

What are the options for change in governance structures and processes that would
enable single accountability for major elements of the health system? The options
should be shaped with regard to the Commission’s service design and governance
principles, and with the allocations of accountability proposed in the Commission’s
first paper, but not limited to them.

•

How might the performance of the five major governance or stewardship functions –
funding, ownership, purchasing, provision and regulation – be strengthened as the
system moves towards single accountability?

The task is to address the governance of the health system as a whole (and as defined
above, also major structural design elements including arrangements for purchasing and
provision of health care). Good governance is required at all levels (specific types of health
services, facilities, regions and so on) but this paper addresses other levels only in relation to
system governance.
In addressing questions about system governance, we were also asked to consider the set of
more technical issues included as Attachment 1.

Some important terms defined
Governance for present purposes is defined
as the structures and processes by which
the health system is regulated, directed and
controlled. It includes the obligations of
stewardship – ensuring that the system is
well sustained for the future as well as
serving the needs of the present.
Governance is done by the people in charge
– their authority is matched with
accountability. Governance in a large
complex system happens at several levels.

The importance and limits of health system
governance
Good governance of the health system is necessary. But it
alone will not solve the major problems confronting the
health system. Effective governance removes barriers,
gives permissions, sets directions, better allocates
resources and enables change. It does not solve patient
care problems, but it can create the conditions under which
problems become solvable.

As noted above, this paper focuses on governance at system level, with less attention to
governance at health care delivery level, and it does not address governance within the
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private sector. However, we do briefly address the role of the private sector in relation to the
major system-level functions, and in particular purchasing and provision of health care.
Health system is used to include health and aged care (because these are the two major
sectors of the system in and between which split responsibility causes great problems – see
below). There are other more difficult questions of scope (how much disability care should be
included? What about other human services?) that we address towards the end of this paper.
Purchasing and commissioning are terms that refer to active decision-making by funders
about what health care should be ‘purchased’ on behalf of consumers, how and from whom
(Harding and Preker 2000). This method has developed as an alternative to simply paying
providers for what they traditionally do (hospital care, mental health care etc). A purchasing
approach requires clear separation of the roles of funding and providing health care, and can
be applied regardless of the mix of public and private ownership and funding within a health
system. The World Health Organisation has argued that strategic purchasing should be
considered as a major option for improving the performance of health systems, because it can
support resource shifts across care boundaries to achieve effective interventions, as well as
reducing ‘administrative rigidities generated by hierarchically structured command-and-control
models’ in publicly operating systems. Purchasing can also create incentives for provider
responsiveness and efficiency, and promote decentralisation of health service management
(Figueres et al, 2005:4). While there are some circumstances where purchasing is undertaken
on a competitive basis, this is not often the best approach in health care. The term
‘commissioning’ is used in this paper to distinguish it from commercial purchasing in the
market place. Purchasing/commissioning decisions are translated into contracts with health
care providers, not into commercial sales.
Corporatisation is defined as the restructuring of public health services into public sector or
not for profit non-government corporations. Management decision making is decentralised to
the hospital/health service Board of Directors. Internationally, corporatisation reforms have
been undertaken in countries such as Canada, the UK and New Zealand in an attempt to
‘mimic the structure and efficiency of private corporations while assuring that social objectives
are still emphasized through public ownership’ (Harding 2000:15).
Single accountability in this paper means that one level of government is held to account for
the performance of particular parts of the health system, or the whole health system (within
the boundaries of government roles). Single accountability can be achieved by structural
reform so that only one level of government has a role; or it can be achieved through financial
and other incentives and penalties that give government incentives to ensure performance.
For example, the Commonwealth and the states could agree that the Commonwealth would
pay the states directly for every public hospital day of stay by someone who would not be in
hospital if (Commonwealth-funded) residential or step-down or home-based care were
available. The Commonwealth would therefore have a strong incentive to ensure access to
the right kind of care when needed (because acute care is more expensive).
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Our approach
In a vigorous public debate about the future of the health care system, there have been many
different prescriptions for change in structures and governance – Commonwealth take over,
local boards, funds pooling, managed care, population health funding, Medicare Gold,
privatisation of health care delivery, and so on. It seems that everyone agrees change is
needed, but there is no consensus on the direction of change. Or if there is – for example,
everyone seems to agree that the split of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and
the states 1 is dysfunctional – agreement breaks down at that point.
The prescriptions seem to go nowhere. So far, there has been a sense that the vested
interests of so many different stakeholders have created policy gridlock – every possible
direction of change is blocked by the interests of one important group or another (including
the interests of government health authorities themselves). There also seems to be
disagreement or confusion about the role of governance structures and processes – what
governance arrangements can and can’t do.
In this context, we have concluded that the most useful approach we can take is to start by
defining the problems the system needs to address, and articulating the design features that
are desirable to enable those problems to be solved or ameliorated. In this way, we seek to
make clear the logical links between goals and options. Accordingly in what follows we make
explicit the logic of our analysis, and the layering of governance structures and processes, in
a way that is designed to identify the pathways governments and the health system could
take. In keeping with the Commission’s terms of reference, we have focused on the role of
governments as the major decision-makers for the health system, while not ignoring the
private sector.
This short paper is necessarily schematic in its analysis of design options. Its purpose is to
clarify the choices that can be made. Once a choice is made, much more detailed work will
be required to translate the preferred option into a national implementation plan.
There are many important areas of care that are not specifically addressed. For example, we
have not said anything about the current problems with dental care, or those facing younger
people with disabilities who need residential care. Neither have we properly addressed the
activities known (somewhat confusingly) as public health – primary prevention of illness and
injury, healthy public policy and related roles. They are currently shared among all of the main
players, for good reasons – policy and action are required at national, state, regional and local
level on different aspects. This critical function falls both within and outside of the health
system.
We begin with a consideration of the major problems we are seeking to address and the
related design principles. We then outline a decision pathway by which options can be
constructed and ultimately chosen. Four possible options are outlined, along with some
common features that we suggest could be part of all options. We conclude with some
suggestions about required next steps.

1

We use ‘state’ to mean both state and territory jurisdictions.
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What problems are we solving?
Table 1 below summarises some major current roles in relation to the five governance
functions. This is not meant to be comprehensive (and excludes, for example, the roles of
professional boards and learned colleges) but is simply designed to illustrate the complexity in
current governance arrangements.
Table 1:
Function

Current location of main governance functions
Commonwealth

Ownership

States/Territories

Private/NGO sector

Public hospitals, community &
public health

Private hospitals and Aged
Care Facilities, private
practices

Funding

Residential and some
community aged care,
MBS, PBS, DVA, State
grants, Indigenous PHC,
30% rebate on insurance

Public hospitals, community &
Health insurance, accident
public health, ambulance, some insurance
public dental services, accident
compensation and disability
care

Commissioning

Limited - DVA and some
NGO community care

Varies - some hospital and NGO Limited - some insurers
services

Provision

Australian Hearing,
C'wealth Rehab Service,
Health Services Aust.

Public hospitals, community &
public health, ambulance

Regulation

Residential aged care,
food standards, health
insurance

Public and private hospitals,
community & public health,
workforce

Private hospitals and
RACFs, private practices

Even with this complexity, there is much in the Australian health system that works well,
including in its governance. However, based on our analysis of current debates and our own
observation of dysfunctional arrangements in the health system, we suggest that there are
nine main problems that any system-level changes should address. They are at two levels –
the problems that directly affect access to effective care for patients; and the problems that
directly affect the performance of the system.

Problems for patients
1. There is inequitable access to services, shaped by place (especially remote and rural
location) and financial barriers to care, among other factors. This is particularly the case for
those services funded under fee for service arrangements. While the health care you receive
should be based on your need, where you live and how much money you have too often
determines what you actually receive and how quickly you receive it.
2. Services are fragmented for those who require ongoing care for complex and
chronic conditions. While the current arrangements work reasonably well for those of us
who have only occasional or episodic health problems, they are not well designed to respond
to the needs that some of us have for coordinated, ongoing care.
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3. The primary health care sector is
fragmented and not well developed.
This problem most affects those who
need ongoing care for chronic
conditions, and those in remote and
rural areas. But it also applies more
generally – for example, depending on
where you live, you may or may not
receive automatic access to support and
advice as a new mother. Finally, there
is too little effort in prevention of illness
and injury, a potentially important
function of the primary health care
system.

Leutz’s Laws of Service Integration
Based on a comparative UK:USA study, Leutz
developed 6 principles to guide integration of health
and community care:
1. You can integrate some of the services for all the
people, and all the services for some of the people, but
you can’t integrate all of the services for all of the
people.
2. Integration costs before it pays.
3. Your integration is my fragmentation.
4. You can’t integrate a square peg and a round hole.
5. The one who integrates calls the tune.
6. All integration is local.
Source: Leutz (1999, 2005).

Problems of system design
4. There is a bewildering array of funding programs, each with its own eligibility criteria,
accountability requirements, timelines and access barriers. Even experienced managers and
clinicians find it hard to be sure their services are getting the funding they’re eligible for.
Duplication and gaps are the norm. Funding complexity spawns regulatory and reporting
complexity – witness the complicated requirements for GPs, and the overhead costs of
administering ‘vertical’ population health programs.
5. Blame- and cost - shifting between levels of government is a major barrier to
improvement in the system of care. This problem has been addressed in the Commission’s
first paper. The current split of responsibilities sets up perverse financial incentives for
governments, whereby one level can ‘win’ financially through measures that cause the other
level to ‘lose’ financially. The impact on patients and care providers is significant, in the form
of unnecessarily fragmented and complex referral and care pathways. But cost shifting is also
highly inefficient – witness the number of state funded hospital beds that are occupied every
day by patients who cannot access Commonwealth funded residential or transition care when
they need it. The resultant blame-shifting (the policies and structures that enable fingerpointing and work against problem-solving) creates an additional barrier to performance
improvement.
6. The workforce is pressured, jobs are less satisfying, we face serious supply
problems and skills are not best utilised. While we have shortages now, the current
workforce is ageing, and future shortages are predicted to be severe. The jobs offered to
skilled staff tend to be defined in ways that were perhaps appropriate 30 years ago but are
not optimal for current and future health care models.
7. The relationship between government, non-government and private services is
suboptimal and contentious. Reflecting the bewildering array of funding programs, there is
a bewildering array of public, private and non-government health care providers, delivering
only some of what a consumer requires and lacking effective linkages to other agencies and
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care options. Relationships between health agencies are too often dependent on personal
relationships rather than transparent communication and referral systems. Coordinated
planning of the government, non-government and private sectors is the exception rather than
the norm.
8. Decision-making is too removed from front line service delivery. In the public sector
in recent years, operational decision-making has become more centralised, with many layers
between those at the front line and those who hold decision-making authority. At the moment,
all state health authorities (with the partial exception of Victoria) have centralised governance
to state level. Many are operating at a larger size with less delegation of operational decisionmaking than would be seen to be feasible in the private sector or in other public systems.
Further, there are inherent conflicts of interest with health departments being expected to
exercise their Westminster responsibilities of serving the government of the day while at the
same time carrying operational responsibility for health service delivery.
9. It is too difficult to introduce and sustain new models of care and other innovation.
While the policy debate goes on, and all the problems listed above take their toll, providers
and policy workers in all sectors continue to experiment, redesign and seek to improve
services. But change is very hard to make, and even harder to sustain. The jungle of funding
rules, split responsibilities, laser-like targeting of eligibility criteria and professional role
demarcations generally seem to overgrow a new model of care once the project funding and
energy are exhausted. Change is too often lost and too seldom replicated. Similarly, the
money and effort expended to get IT systems that can deliver needed information at the right
place and the right time seems out of all proportion with the modest results.

What would better governance and system design mean for patients?
Structures and policies at system level can seem very remote from the problems that patients
and care providers in all sectors would like to see resolved. To illustrate the ways in which
changes in governance could affect access and the quality of care as well as the roles of
health care providers, we outline some typical patient care problems, and then explain what
could be different if the split in the responsibilities of government were resolved and equitable
funding were available. We introduce here some arrangements that are explained later in this
paper.
Table 2:

Some patient care problems that could be resolved under new
arrangements

Patient Care Problem

Potential improvement

Patient in a remote area:
Your small community
doesn’t have a GP. The
Commonwealth
Department of Health and
Ageing cannot assist.

An alternative method of providing access to GP care is organised by
your health funding authority (which allocates public health funding for
your region), by contracting with a medical organisation that employs
GPs for this purpose. [This is already happening in some remote areas
through special arrangements]. This arrangement can’t alone solve the
shortage of GPs, but it can influence redistribution. Alternatively, a
different set of financial incentives for the Commonwealth could mean
that the Commonwealth is more actively engaged in setting incentives for
GPs to work in small remote communities where fee-for-service is an
inadequate method of payment.
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Patient Care Problem

Potential improvement

General Practitioner: Your
elderly patient who til now
has been coping at home
attends on a Friday
afternoon clearly too frail
and confused to be safe
over the weekend at home
alone. In desperation, you
send him to the local
hospital emergency
department, knowing they’ll
have to keep him safe at
least til Monday.

Your practice nurse is now able to seek emergency access to transition
care in a nearby aged care facility for your patient, where he will be cared
for over the weekend, and assessed as to his need for home-based
support or accommodation in residential care. Home-based support
services are organised a week later, and your patient is discharged home
on the following Monday, with both formal carers and family support
organised. You are involved in formulating his care plan, including
adjustments to his medications, and you are notified at least 24 hours in
advance of his transfer home. You have access to the clinical pharmacist
from the transition care facility to help you to monitor what are likely to be
ongoing changes in medication needs. This happy outcome is made
possible because the regional funding authority has decided to invest in
transition care for precisely this sort of situation, and can afford it
because there are enough avoided hospital admissions to make a
difference.

Diabetes educator: Your
community health-based
diabetes education program
should be available to all
newly diagnosed patients in
your catchment area, but
you are the only staff
member who can do this
work and you can only get
to 40% of those who need
your program.

Your local primary care network (involving community health, general
practice, representatives of local private allied health and diagnostic
practices, medical and nursing specialists from the local hospital, two
community representatives and a planner from the regional funding
authority) identifies better management of diabetic patients as one of
three main priorities in this year’s plan. The planner undertakes to
conduct an analysis of the benefits and costs of making diabetes
education available to all, and a working group prepares a care proposal
to guide this work. If the analysis shows a net benefit, the RFA will
seriously seek to respond, because even though there will be an upfront
additional cost, the savings over time from better diabetes management
will accrue to the RFA’s commissioning budget.

Patient with a serious
chronic condition
requiring coordinated
care: Even though you
have a GP who does her
best, you can’t get the
services you need when
you need them, because of
barriers between private
and public, Commonwealthand state- funded services,
and rationing of some
services.

You are assessed and enrolled in a special program for people with
chronic conditions, and your GP arranges for a care coordinator (in the
private or public sector) to be contracted to organise your care, drawing
on all the resources available. You pay less for medicines, your GP has
better access to your various specialists for advice and coordination and
the care coordinator arranges payment for all the allied health and home
care services you require, whether in the private or public sector. Your
care coordinator works with your GP and medical specialists to plan for
your continuing care needs and ensure that everything that helps people
with your condition to stay as well as possible for as long as possible is
available. This includes making sure that you (and your family or carers)
have the information and support you need to take good care of yourself
and to have a good quality of life.
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How can we get there from here?
We have taken the nine problems outlined above as the challenge that any options for
change in governance structures and functions should address. Good governance can’t alone
solve most of them. For example, good governance won’t of itself solve workforce problems,
but it might make jobs for health professionals more satisfying, and enhance their ability to
improve care. Good governance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improvement it can remove barriers, give permissions, set directions, better allocate resources and enable
change.
The Commission in its first paper focused on accountability by governments to the community
and suggested an allocation of accountability for parts of the health system that largely
matches the current funding responsibilities. The allocations proposed are shown in Table 2.
The Commission’s proposal that the nominated level of government accept accountability for
the relevant sectors without the matching authority is an expedient but we think unsustainable
arrangement, requiring the development and maintenance of sophisticated monitoring and
financial incentive systems. As the Commission acknowledged, the other problem is that it is
technically difficult to separate some of the identified sectors. For example, how can
responsibility for maternal and child health not be part of primary care? And how can mental
health be separated from community health? While the Commission’s proposals would no
doubt solve some problems, others would inevitably be created and new blame- and costshifting possibilities would be opened up. This is consistent with Leutz’s third law – ‘Your
integration is my fragmentation’ (Leutz 1999:91).
Table 3:

NHHRC proposals for single accountability, April 2008

Sector of health system

Level of government suggested by the
Commission in its 1st report

Primary health care (including GPs and community health)

Commonwealth

Public hospitals

State

Mental health

State

Maternal and child health

State

Public health

State

Aged care

Commonwealth

Illness prevention

Commonwealth

On the other hand, major structural change is always painful and expensive, and usually
requires several years of transition and re-development before benefits are realised.
However, there is an opportunity now to focus on a long term vision for the health system of
the future, that could enable Australia to meet the challenges the health system faces over
the next twenty years and more. We note that Australia is not alone in this. All OECD
countries are grappling with the challenge of ageing populations and increasing burden of
chronic disease for which current health funding and delivery structures are not well suited. A
key question in the Australian context is whether the translation of such a vision into reality
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will be possible without more
fundamental structural reform of our
health and aged care systems.

A longer term view
While the Commission’s proposals in its
first report will help in the shorter-term,
more fundamental reform will be
required for the future. The nature and
scope of this reform should be shaped
by the response to three fundamental
questions. The first logical question is
this:

Three fundamental questions
1. If we maintain the split of responsibility between the
Commonwealth and the States/Territories will it be possible to
address the big problems that will face the Australian health care
system of the future?
2. Is it possible to address the problems of split responsibility
without structural change in accountability (ie the allocation of
authority over funding, regulation, performance)?
3. Who should be held accountable for health system
performance, and by extension, who should be responsible for
funding health and aged care delivery?

1. Can the nine problems listed above be addressed without ending blame-shifting, or
to put it in governance terms, without resolving split responsibility?
We suggest that the answer to this question is no, and we support this conclusion with the
evidence of both Commonwealth and state-based attempts at reform in recent years. As
previously reported (see, for example, Rix et al 2005 and Dwyer 2004) recent reviews and
restructures in every Australian state can be read as attempts to address these very problems
in the absence of a solution to split responsibility. While many good ideas have been
formulated, and much good innovation work has been done, the fundamental problems
remain.
Our conclusion is that any attempt at long-term serious reform of the Australian health system
must tackle the fundamental problems that arise from the split of responsibility between state
and federal governments, including the resultant split between policy and funding for ‘health’
and ‘aged care’.
The second big question then is this:
2. Can the problems of split responsibility be addressed without structural change in
accountability (ie the allocation of authority over funding, regulation and
performance)?
We suggest that the answer to this question is probably not or, at least, not for long. But there
are some significant improvements that could be made in what we call the ‘renovation option’,
which we outline later in this paper.
If we then pursue the options for bringing government health care accountability under one
umbrella, the next logical question is:
3. Who should be held accountable for the performance of the Australian health
system, and with it, be responsible for system-level governance and funding of health
and aged care delivery?
While all entities within the health and aged care systems need to take responsibility and be
accountable for their performance, at government level there are three logical options, the
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Commonwealth, the states, or separate bodies which we call Joint Health Commission/s
(JHC’s). 2
We have developed each of these options in this paper. In doing so, we first applied some
design principles.

Six Design Principles
The six design principles we have adopted are:
1. Only fix what’s broken
Change is expensive (though hopefully less so than no change) and disruptive. Changes
should be considered by exception, or on the margin. That is, we assume that everything not
explicitly changed in the options outlined below continues as it is, at least until those
responsible under new arrangements make alternative decisions. This principle is necessary
when the project is to change a large complex system while it continues to operate 24/7/365.
It includes a starting position that the benefits of existing efficient arrangements (such as
Medicare Australia’s role in processing payments to providers of care) should be retained.
2. Enact national leadership
The community’s strong expectation of national leadership and some consistency across the
country should be honoured through a capacity for national policy making, continuation of
some existing national arrangements (and the creation of some new ones), and through the
establishment of a national health charter (or statement of health care entitlement - see the
section on common features later in this paper) which would underpin ‘people and family
centred care’ (NHHRC, 2008, p 36).
3. The system must be designed as a system, with coherent roles, authorities and
accountabilities
The design of national health systems is not a problem with a single right answer. There are
many combinations of governance and other design elements that can work in different
cultures, geographies and populations. The challenge for Australia at this time is to find a
coherent set of arrangements that will work for us, building on the strengths of what we have
now, our established preferences (including the principles of universal access and choice),
and an awareness of the future challenges the system will face.
4. Maintain the universality of Medicare
A key strength of the Australian health care system is Medicare and the entitlement that all
Australians have to the medical and pharmaceutical benefits it provides. In accordance with
the Commission’s terms of reference, Australia’s national Medicare system needs to be
maintained and potentially strengthened.
5. All service integration is local
While it is clear that people with complex and chronic conditions need better coordination than
is supported by current system arrangements, it is also true that service integration is neither
necessary nor economic for other kinds of needs, and won’t be comprehensive. We therefore
2

The concept of Joint Health Commissions is largely based on the work of John Menadue. See, for example,
http://cpd.org.au/article/health-coalition-of-the-willing
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accept Leutz’s sixth law of service integration, which is that integration has to be implemented
locally to suit local needs and conditions (Leutz, 2005:9). The corollary is that larger policies
should facilitate rather than dictate the shape and speed of change of local arrangements. A
further corollary is that coordinated regional health planning is essential.
6. Accountability for funding and commissioning health and aged care is just as
important as accountability for providing health and aged care
The functions of commissioning and providing health care should be clearly delineated, in
order to enable accountability for both commissioning decisions and good care delivery.
The ‘purchaser-provider split’ has a chequered history in health care. Experiments in
complete separation of these roles, notably in New Zealand in the 1990s, have not achieved
the stated goals (Ashton et al, 2005). It can also be difficult for purchasers or commissioners
to get the incentives right because small movements in definition or price can have large
effects on delivery. Further, providers hold many of the skills, have a wide knowledge base
and have the local background knowledge needed for wise commissioning decisions.
However, active commissioning has proven important in some aspects of reform of care
delivery, for example in mental health care, where government health authorities have acted
as commissioners, defining models of care and awarding contracts to a new range of
providers. Conversely, some role separation enables providers to focus more closely on
leading and directing the operations they are responsible for.
We suggest that commissioning may be more important when health care delivery is being
reformed; and that while the system may benefit from a range of approaches to
commissioning for different purposes, attention to the commissioning function is critical in
system design.
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Options for the governance and financing of
Australia’s future health care system
The options described in this section flow logically from different answers to the reform
questions we posed above. While there are more complex options to be considered in
detailed system design, and some common features, the schematic decision pathway shown
in Figure 1 identifies the high level choices that define the options that follow.
Figure 1

Decision pathway
DECISION
Can the problems of split
responsibility be addressed
without structural change?

No

Yes

DECISION
Commonwealth assumes
responsibility for the
governance and financing of the
whole Australian health system?

OPTION 4
Renovate

DECISION
What parts of the system can be
renovated to solve at least some
of these problems?

Yes

No

OPTION 1
Commonwealth

DECISION
Pool Commonwealth and
State/Territory health funding
into one funding pool?

See Table 7

See Table 4
Yes
DECISION
Will the Commonwealth need regional
HFAs, at least in the larger states, to
plan and commission services?

No

Yes

Option 1a

Option 1b

DECISION
Who should hold and
manage health funding?

OPTION 2
States/Territories

OPTION 3
Joint Commonwealth/State
Health Commissions (CSHC)

See Table 5
See Table 6
DECISION
Will the States and Territories, at
least the larger ones, need
regional HFAs to plan and
commission services?

No

Yes

Option 2a

Option 2b

DECISION
Will the CSHCs need regional
HFAs, at least in the larger
states, to plan and commission
services?

No

Yes

Option 3a

Option 3b
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Option 1: Commonwealth takes responsibility
In this option, the Commonwealth takes responsibility for the governance of the entire health
and aged care system and its public funding, and with it, clear accountability to the Australian
people for overall performance of the health system. Fiscal arrangements between the
Commonwealth and the States and Territories are re-balanced, so that all funding for public
health and aged care functions is retained/recouped by the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth is the sole funder of the public system. This means that it alone is
accountable to the public for the amount of public funding spent on health care and for how
that money is spent. Its role in relation to the private system (such as private services funded
by MBS or PBS and Private Health Insurance) remains as is. In addition to its traditional role,
the Commonwealth is responsible for commissioning public health services. The combination
of responsibility for funding and/or regulating both public and private delivery will provide
opportunities for the Commonwealth to develop programs that better coordinate or integrate
patient care across these sectors.
Providers continue with current ownership arrangements – state, NGO, local government or
private sector. The Commonwealth is free to commission health and aged care from any
sector.
Table 4:

Governance functions in the Commonwealth option

Functions

Commonwealth

States

Private/NGO

Funding

Yes. Maintenance of the
current functions of
Medicare Australia – plus
contract services from a
range of providers

No

As is

Ownership

No – as is

As is or corporatise

As is

Commissioning

Yes

No

As is

Provision

As is

As is or vacate

As is or contracted

Regulation

Most

Residual statutory
responsibilities, reduce over
time

Contracted out as
expedient

Other issues

While the Commonwealth has considerable expertise in managing fee for service
reimbursement schemes, it has little experience in funding or managing other
health care. Nor does it have expertise in equity-based population planning. The
new role of the Commonwealth is not compatible with current DoHA culture or
expertise. Significant change would be required within DoHA, particularly if it were
to retain commissioning functions internally (see below).
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There are two sub-options under the Commonwealth model.
Option 1(a) – the Commonwealth plans and commissions all health and aged care
services
Under this option, the policy, planning and monitoring functions of the states transfer to the
Commonwealth and these functions are undertaken by the Commonwealth Department of
Health and Ageing (DoHA) through its Canberra and regional (capital city) offices.
Option 1(b) - the Commonwealth establishes regional Health Funding Authorities
(HFAs)
Under Option 1(b) the Commonwealth establishes HFAs to undertake the commissioning
function, on the basis that it could not sensibly be done from Canberra or through the capital
city offices as currently structured. Regions might be whole states (in Tasmania, Northern
Territory, ACT and perhaps South Australia), or might cross state boundaries (eg a
commissioning authority for Northern Australia, across far north Queensland, the Top End of
NT and northern WA).
There are two further sub-options for the structure of the HFAs. The first is that the HFA is a
Commonwealth agency that is part of DoHA. The second is that the HFA is established as a
health portfolio agency separate from DoHA, under the Financial Management and
Accountability Act (FMA) 1997. If under the FMA, HFAs would be accountable to the Minister
but with a level of independence equivalent to that of other FMA agencies such as Cancer
Australia, the NHMRC and the Private Health Insurance Ombudsman. This latter
arrangement seems more appropriate given the role of the HFA to make commissioning
decisions on behalf of the regional/state population.
Either way, the HFA structure will be better placed to balance provider and population
interests, both geographically and in terms of population sub-groups. The size will need to be
sufficiently large to manage and spread risks as well as small enough to allow for population
planning and informed commissioning.
The regional HFAs plan, commission, fund and regulate health care providers in their region
(within national standards, policies and budgets) on behalf of the Commonwealth. Thus the
policy function of the states transfers to DoHA but the planning, commissioning and
monitoring functions transfer to Commonwealth HFAs.
HFAs are allocated a population needs-adjusted share of health funding. They are
accountable for health care for the regional population. They commission the full range of
services from prevention to palliation to improve and maintain the health of the regional
population. This includes responsibility for building coordination and integration of local health
services. Attachment 2 outlines one aspect of population based funding, modelling the impact
of equitable distribution of MBS funding.
These responsibilities imply the skill mix that will be required, much of which currently resides
in state health departments and in existing regional and area health services. Regardless of
whether Option 1(a) or Option 1(b) is selected, the commissioning body will require staff with
expertise in health needs analysis, health planning and contracting. This includes expertise in
building relationships and fostering the integration of local health services.
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Medicare Australia continues to act as the transaction agent for MBS and PBS services,
along with any additional payment roles the Commonwealth may allocate. The national MBS
is retained but could be expanded over time to incorporate other types of payments.
HFAs negotiate contracts for health care provision with local service providers (public or
private sector), addressing efficiency and volume risks. While the majority of funding is on the
basis of outputs (eg casemix, MBS), contracts could also be on the basis of populationcovered (eg health promotion) or funding-for-capacity (eg regional epidemiological
surveillance).
A key difference between Option 1(a) and Option 1(b) is in the flow of funding. In Option 1(a)
funding flows from the Commonwealth directly to providers either as retrospective payments
for services rendered (MBS, PBS and so on) or as prospective contracts. In Option 1(b) each
region receives a population needs-adjusted share of funding. The HFA then uses its regional
funding allocation to pay for services rendered (MBS, PBS and so on) or to fund prospective
contracts. In both Options 1(a) and 1(b) the responsibility for commissioning is separate from
ownership and delivery.
States may choose to continue to manage
their health services and hospitals, providing
services as purchased by the
Commonwealth. Alternately, they could
corporatise their hospitals and health
services along Canadian lines (ie through
community or University-type ownership
arrangements) such as is already the case
for faith-based ‘public’ hospitals in several
Australian states. These corporations might
be individual health care facilities or
networks of facilities. This would effectively
turn public health services into not for profit
non-government agencies, similar to
Foundation Trusts in the UK. States could,
of course, choose a combination of these
two strategies. State health authorities
would also retain some roles in accordance
with statutory responsibilities (eg disaster
coordination, public health emergency
responses).

The UK Model: Foundation Trusts
In England, hospitals and related services are organised as
Trusts, similar to area health services. Trusts can apply to
become Foundation Trusts which are independent legal entities
called Public Benefit Corporations. Foundation Trusts are free
from central government and local health authority control but
continue to deliver services to their local populations, as
purchased by Primary Health Care Trusts and subject to national
standards.
Foundation Trusts have more freedom to develop local solutions
to health problems, including setting up partnerships with other
health providers. Local residents and patients can become
“members” of the Trust. Members can serve on the Trust Board
of Governors along with representatives of staff and other
stakeholders. Non executive directors on the Trust Board of
Directors are appointed .from amongst the Board of Governors.
The government maintains reserve powers including step in
rights. The public assets involved are protected by prohibitions
on demutualisation or privatisation.
Source: UK Dept of Health, 2005

The question arises as to whether commissioning as well as service provision could be
contracted to non-government organisations (including private health insurers). This is an
available option, and is canvassed in a separate commissioned paper on ‘A Mixed
Public:Private System for 2020’. This option may be appropriate for example, for people with
chronic and complex conditions who are assessed as requiring enhanced access to care and
coordination. This would be a decision to be made by the Commonwealth, or by individual
HFAs. Current risk adjustment technologies are not sufficiently robust to allow governments to
contract out purchasing of all public care for partial populations (eg those with private health
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insurance) because cost risk cannot be estimated reliably in advance. The exception outlined
above is a population in which risk and likely costs have already been individually clinically
assessed. Alternatively, it may be feasible to contract out purchasing for particular health
programs for entire regional populations, but only if it were possible to avoid creating new
cost- and blame-shifting opportunities at regional level.

Health Funding Authorities
In each of the three options for major structural reform, we suggest the use of regional Health Funding Authorities.
Their structures, roles and accountabilities vary in each option, but the essential features are:
1.

The HFA’s mission is to plan, commission, fund and regulate the range of health care services that best
meets the health care needs of the regional population, within the policies and budgets allocated by
government.

2.

To enable the HFA to focus on this role, it should not have operational responsibility for health care delivery,
nor should it report to the health department that is responsible for broader government policy. It should
report to the relevant Minister or Parliament in relation to its performance of its functions, and may be
established by statute or regulation.

3.

The HFA is made up of a board, appointed by the relevant Minister or Governor-In-Council, with the members
being selected on the basis of expertise, including knowledge of the region and its health care needs.

4.

The HFA, through its Chief Executive, employs people with skills in health planning, health care, health needs
assessment, performance monitoring, finance, community and clinician engagement and data management.

5.

The HFA supports and resources networks or other collaborative arrangements among the region’s health
care providers and representatives of their patients or clients and communities, to enable local approaches to
integration and coordination of care to be developed, among other benefits.

6.

The work of the HFA is supported by national health policies, standards, research and information, which
guide its work and ensure national consistency in meeting agreed universal entitlements and standards.

Option 2: States take responsibility
This option is in many ways the mirror image of Option 1.
The Commonwealth transfers its share of funding for health and aged care to the states using
a population needs-based funding formula. That formula is the responsibility of the Grants
Commission and the funding is possibly encapsulated in a new kind of term-limited Health
Agreement. A small proportion is retained for funding of national institutions (such as, for
example, the NHMRC, AIHW and regulatory and national representative bodies). The
Commonwealth retains roles required by the constitution (for example, health services for
defence personnel and veterans) as well as its share of the national functions described
above (policy, intelligence and information, standards, regulation). The Department of Health
and Ageing continues to exist in a scaled down form, but most functions and staff are
transferred to states.
States are responsible for planning, commissioning, funding and local regulation of health and
aged care services. The budget for MBS, PBS and other Commonwealth funding programs is
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transferred to the states, but MBS and PBS continue as national patient entitlement,
categorisation and billing systems. Medicare Australia continues as the payer and processes
claims on behalf of the states in the same way it now does for the Department of Veteran
Affairs. The national MBS is retained but could be expanded over time to incorporate other
types of payments.
As discussed in more detail in Attachment 2, states are required to meet all MBS and PBS
claims made by their residents. Over time, states may decide to offer alternative funding
methods to GPs, pharmacists etc, which they would fund by reallocating unspent funds from
their MBS and PBS budgets (eg to enable different delivery arrangements in remote areas).
Table 5:

Governance functions in the State option

Functions

Commonwealth

States

Private/NGO

Funding

Wholesale transfer to states.
Medicare Australia
maintained as payment
agency for states/HFAs

Fund care delivery and other
functions

As is

Ownership

As is

States may own but may not
directly operate hospitals
and health services

As is

Commissioning

Broad priority setting and
facilitation of agreements for
services that cross state
borders

States commission public
health services

As is

Provision

As is

Public health care providers
may be corporatised. States
contract with a range of
providers.

As is, including as
contracted by state
health authorities

Regulation

National policy, standards,
registration, regulation

State regulation

As is

Other issues

There is no incentive for the Commonwealth to maintain growth in its share of
health funding if all responsibility is transferred to the states. Given predicted
future needs, this option would only be viable if a strict funding formula for the
Commonwealth contribution could be agreed.

As with the Commonwealth model, there are two sub-options under the State model, with
States free to decide which option to adopt. Either way, they are required to demonstrate that
the commissioning and providing functions are effectively separated.
Option 2(a) - the State plans and commissions all health and aged care services
This is similar to Option 1(a) in the Commonwealth option.
Option 2(b) - the states (or at least the larger ones) establish regional Health Funding
Authorities (HFAs) in order to fulfil the commissioning function
Under this option, the regional HFAs plan, commission, fund and regulate health care
providers in their region (within national standards and policies and state plans and budgets).
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The HFA is a state agency. In states where services are corporatised, the HFA is part of the
state health department. In states where services are not corporatised, the HFA is a health
portfolio agency under the relevant state legislation, with legal status similar to that of the
existing state Health Care Complaints Commissions. This is designed to reduce the conflict of
interest problem that currently exists for the states as both purchasers and providers.
As in Option 1(b), for larger states the HFA structure will be better placed to balance provider
and population interests, both geographically and in terms of population sub-groups. The size
will need to be sufficiently large to manage and spread risks as well as small enough to allow
for population planning and informed commissioning.
HFAs are accountable for health care for the regional population. They commission the full
range of services from prevention to palliation to improve and maintain the health of the
regional population. This includes responsibility for building coordination and integration of
local health services.
HFAs negotiate contracts for health care provision with local service providers, addressing
efficiency and volume risks. While the majority of funding is on the basis of outputs (eg
casemix, MBS), contracts could also be on the basis of population-covered (eg health
promotion) or funding-for-capacity (eg epidemiological surveillance).
As with the Commonwealth option, these responsibilities imply the skill mix that will be
required, much of which already exists in state health departments and in regional and area
health services. Regardless of whether Option 2(a) or Option 2(b) is selected, the
commissioning body will require staff with expertise in health needs analysis, health planning
and contracting. This includes expertise in building relationships and fostering the integration
of local health services.
Service provision remains as is or, in the case of state-owned agencies, could be
corporatised to achieve the separation of commissioning from provision of care.
As with the Commonwealth option, a key difference between Option 2(a) and Option 2(b) is in
the flow of funding. In Option 2(a) funding flows from the state directly to providers either as
retrospective payments for services rendered (MBS, PBS and so on) or as prospective
contracts. In Option 2(b) each region receives a population needs-adjusted share of funding.
The HFA then uses its regional funding allocation to pay for services rendered (MBS, PBS
and so on) or to fund prospective contracts.
The allocation of population based funding to HFAs offers the potential for HFAs to enter into
arrangements that substitute for the underspending of MBS in some regions resulting from
the undersupply of doctors and other health professionals (e.g. rural and outer metropolitan
areas). Conversely, regions with high utilisation of MBS will potentially be underfunded for
these service levels. The reconciliation of fee for service programs within population based
budgets will present particular risks to states (which lack the fiscal capacity of the
Commonwealth to absorb cost overruns) under this option. In any case, the obligation to
continue to provide universal access for all Australians to medical services should be
preserved (by inclusion in the National Health Charter or other means).
We note that this option could have the potential to ‘let the Commonwealth off the hook’ over
time. The Commonwealth still needs to be involved because states do not have the tax base
to allow them to fully take over funding responsibility. The design of arrangements to ensure

18
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be taken to be the views of the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission or the Australian Government.

that the Commonwealth has an incentive to respond to growth in health care needs and
technical capabilities with increased funding would be a major challenge, given that it would
no longer have any accountability for health care delivery. One solution would be to use an
independent indexation-setting body, similar to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC) in the USA (MedPAC, 2008).

Option 3: Joint Commonwealth: State Health Commissions
This option involves the Commonwealth and each of the states establishing a third-party
health authority to plan and commission health services in the state. Commonwealth and
state funds for health and aged care are pooled and allocated to the Health Commission.
Table 6:

Governance functions in the Joint Health Commission option

Functions

JHC/s

Commonwealth

States

Private/NGO

Funding

Receive
pooled C’w
and state
funds

Wholesale to JHC.
Medicare Australia
maintained as payment
agency for JHC/s.

Wholesale to JHC

As is

Ownership

No

As is

As is or corporatise

As is

Commissioning

All commissioning

Broad planning for
equity and priority
setting and facilitation of
agreements for services
that cross state borders

State based priority
setting and planning
targets

As is or as
contracted (eg
brokerage, care
coordination)

Provision

No

As is

Public health care
provision by states or
by corporatised public
agencies, or as
contracted to private/
NGO sector

As is, or as
contracted.

Regulation

Of provider
performance

National policies and
standards

State standards

As is or as
contracted.

Other issues

While both levels of governments will share rather than split accountability to the
community, transparent decision-making will be critical to prevent the development of
a new form of blame shifting.

The Health Commission takes responsibility for planning, commissioning, funding and
regulating the delivery of health and aged care in that state. State and national health
departments continue to exist in a scaled down form, to fulfil other responsibilities and to act
as funders and contract managers for the Joint Health Commission, but most staff transfer to
the Commission. The Commission acts as a board of directors, to whom the CE of the
Commission reports. The Commission is responsible jointly to the state and to the
Commonwealth for performance of its functions, and reports to both Ministers or Parliaments.
Providers remain as they are. States may choose to continue to operate as providers, or to
corporatise their provider agencies. Medicare Australia retains its national payer role, with a
national MBS that could be expanded over time to incorporate other types of payments. The
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national functions outlined above (national health charter, policy, standards, intelligence and
information, professional registration) are undertaken through AHMC and AHMAC or its
successor organisations and DoHA.
As with the previous two options, there are two sub-options under the Health Commission
model.
Option 3(a) - the Health Commission plans and commissions all health and aged care
services for the state
This is similar to the Commonwealth and state options.
Option 3(b) - the Health Commissions (or at least those in the larger states) establish
regional Health Funding Authorities (HFAs) in order to fulfil the commissioning
function
Under this option, the HFA is, in effect, a regional office of the Health Commission. As under
other options, the HFA structure will need to balance provider and population interests, both
geographically and in terms of population sub-groups. The size will need to be sufficiently
large to manage and spread risks as well as small enough to allow for population planning
and informed commissioning.
The regional HFAs plan, commission, fund and regulate health care providers in their region
(within national standards and policies and Health Commission plans and budgets). The skill
mix required is the same as under the Commonwealth and state options.
Again, a key difference between Option 3(a) and Option 3(b) is in the flow of funding. In
Option 3(a) funding flows from the Health Commission directly to providers either as
retrospective payments for services rendered (MBS, PBS and so on) or as prospective
contracts. In Option 3(b) each region receives a population needs-adjusted share of funding.
The RFA then uses its regional funding allocation to pay for services rendered (MBS, PBS
and so on) or to fund prospective contracts.
We note that under this option, it is difficult to assign clear accountability for health to an
elected government. That is, the Commission option potentially removes the care delivery
problems caused by split funding roles, but it may not really resolve the problem of split
accountability of governments to the community.
What about a National Health Commission?
We considered but have not developed a national-level joint Health Commission model for
fund-holding. The difficulties of coordinating the funds pooling for all states, as well as the
Commonwealth, and then redistributing the funding, seemed insurmountable. The difficulties
that the National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) has experienced in achieving this in
only one area are evidence of the size of this problem.
It would also appear as too monolithic in a context where some measure of devolution and
local-level accountability is a more attractive direction. It is also the option which requires
most attention to the problem of scope – see the Scope section below.
There may, however, be a role for a National Health Commission as a joint Commonwealth
and state body responsible for national policy and planning and for setting the national
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framework within which any of the governance options would operate. This possibility is taken
up in the Common features section below.

Option 4: Renovate
Under this option, the existing structures of Commonwealth and state health authorities are
not radically altered. This ‘renovation’ option might be seen as the end point. Alternatively, it
might be a development path to one of the other options. For example, the next round of
AHCAs might be designed to achieve the renovation option, with a provision to make more
structural changes which would entrench successful reforms in the subsequent ACHA (20142018).
Either way, the focus is on developing better specification and some ‘teeth’ for accountability
(financial and public reporting measures), and the incremental development of reform in high
priority areas. In this option, the parties agree on a case by case basis to pool funds or shift
accountabilities in three major categories of reform:


assigning accountabilities for service performance in specific areas to one level of
government. This option has already been proposed by the Commission in its first report
and was summarised above. As outlined in the Commission’s first report, the assignment
of accountabilities does not imply an immediate transfer of functions between
governments. Nor does it imply that financial responsibility would fall on only one level of
government. Rather, these arrangements would be designed so that each level of
government carries clear political (and bureaucratic) accountability for meeting the
public’s expectations in specific areas of health service delivery. Under such an
arrangement, failure to achieve performance benchmarks could result in both financial
penalties and political consequences. As one example, the Commonwealth could be
exposed to the costs that hospitals incur in meeting the needs of people with chronic
disease who could have been treated in the primary care sector. The technology to
identify admissions in this category and measure the incidence would need to be
developed, but this is technically feasible. It would reduce the perverse incentives for both
levels of government arising from the current splits in responsibility.



better integration or coordination of care for specific populations (such as the frail aged,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and others living in remote
communities as well as those with specified conditions).



the reform of governance and funding arrangements for specific sectors or for specific
functions of the care delivery system. Examples of these might include primary health
care, mental health, aged care or information and communication technologies (ICT).

As these categories imply, some of these renovation options may involve fine-tuning while
others would constitute more fundamental reform of a specific aspect of health care.
Fee-for-service remains the dominant mode of payment for general practice and private
specialist care, and the Primary Care Strategy adjusts arrangements for payment for allied
health services, and related changes in the gate-keeping role of GPs. Over time, the parties
could agree to changes in the funding for primary care designed to enhance the
comprehensiveness and accessibility of care, such as per capita payments for enrolled
populations with high primary care needs. Other opportunities for renovation are identified
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over time through existing structures such as AHMC and AHMAC and through current
national initiatives including the work of the NHHRC, the National Prevention Taskforce, the
Primary Care Strategy and so on.
Under these arrangements, the Commonwealth could, for example, make agreements with
individual states to take over financial responsibility for all care of those older people and
people with disabilities who have high care needs. Equally, the Commonwealth could move to
simplify its own funding programs, in addition to the current work to reduce the number of
Specific Purpose Payments to the states.
This option is intended to enable preparation for transition to more fundamental reform, based
on the results of incremental change as outlined above. A significant reworking of the
Australian Health Care Agreements is the main immediate instrument to enable this option.
Such new AHCA’s will need to include commitments to reform in high priority areas and to the
goal of moving to single-point accountability. Clearer incentives and sanctions to reinforce the
accountability of both the Commonwealth and the states for achievement against the agreed
reform agenda will also be needed. The next AHCA’s would then be designed to achieve the
renovation option, with a provision to make more structural changes which would entrench
successful reforms in the subsequent ACHA (2014-2018).
But there is no need under the renovation option for reform initiatives to be limited to those
agreed in a five year health agreement. Renovations can occur whenever the Commonwealth
and the relevant state agree on a required reform. Likewise, the Commonwealth can also take
unilateral action for major reform in those areas where it currently has responsibility such as
reform of the primary health care program. This process could enable testing of options to
achieve single point accountability.
Strong policy leadership and sustained cooperation among health authorities will be required.
The flexibility for different developments in different jurisdictions is a potential strength, but
remains dependant on Commonwealth preparedness to accommodate such flexibility.
Commonwealth and state health authorities will necessarily be the main negotiators of such
changes. However, it may be helpful to open up the negotiation process because those
working in the health authorities have a conflict of interest when changes in health authority
roles are on the table.
The five governance functions are shared more or less as is, as summarised in Table 7
below.
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Table 7:

Governance functions in the renovation option

Functions

Commonwealth

States

Private/NGO

Funding

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with one or more states

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with the Commonwealth

As is

Ownership

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with one or more states

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with the Commonwealth

As is

Commissioning

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with one or more states

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with the Commonwealth

As is

Provision

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with one or more states

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with the Commonwealth

As is

Regulation

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with one or more states

Status quo except as agreed
jointly with the Commonwealth

As is

Other issues

This is an attractive option in being relatively less threatening to existing interests
and arrangements, and enabling potential structural change to be tested
incrementally. The down-side is a perception that the promise of the reform process
in the end may amount to simply ‘more of the same’.

Common features
In developing the options above, it became apparent that some functions and features did not
change between options:
A national health charter
Regardless of the option selected, there should be a national statement of entitlement,
signifying that all Australians will have access to certain agreed forms and standards of care.
The statement should be developed over time, based on a combination of knowledge about
what works, and agreement that it should be available to all. We would suggest it start with
such basic measures as universal mother and baby health care, access to primary clinical
care, and support for people with disabilities including those caused by ageing. It should
incorporate a statement that gives more concrete shape to the concept of ‘people and family
centred care’. Such a statement could be an important foundation for the health system’s
response to the call to close the health gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians. Responsibility for developing and maintaining the national health charter could be
taken by an existing body like the NHMRC or the AIHW, or a new body (perhaps a National
Health Commission) could be established for this purpose. It should be accountable to AHMC
or its equivalent.
National policy and planning
In all options, capacity for national policy-making and planning should be sustained under the
auspices of AHMC and AHMAC or its successors. High priority policy areas, for example,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health or mental health, could be nationally specified and
their budgets and service arrangements protected. Further, regardless of the option adopted,
there will be a need for ongoing reform and development of the health system once the work
of the current Commission is completed. That ongoing development needs to be undertaken
under the auspices of AHMC and AHMAC or its successors.
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National health intelligence and
information
Australia is well served by some
of its national health institutions,
and given its size could be well
served by national strategies in
important areas like information
and communication technology
for health. National health data
are improving, and governance
change should disrupt this
progress as little as possible.
National regulation
Similarly, we need to sustain our
capacity to standardise some
regulatory arrangements across
the country, such as the Aged
Care Accreditation and Standards
Agency, and nationally
harmonised registration of health
professionals.
Regional planning and delivery

Funding of Indigenous Primary Health Care
The current problems in governance of the Australian health
system are magnified in the funding and regulation of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander health care. In particular:
1. The fee-for-service funding of general practice and pharmacy
care contributes to access problems (especially but not only in
rural and remote areas). Indigenous people aren’t able to get
anything like a ‘fair share’ of MBS- and PBS-funded services
(Deeble et al, 1998; Dwyer, Silburn and Wilson, 2004).
2. Efforts to pool funds between the Commonwealth and states
are impeded by all the problems of multiple players with different
agendas and priorities, so that good intentions and good ideas
like the Primary Health Care Access Program (PHCAP) fail in
implementation.
3. Dollar for dollar, Indigenous health care providers face a
heavier burden of managing multiple contracts and complying
with multiple reporting requirements than other primary care
providers (Source: unpublished Victorian data).
For these and many other reasons, Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people use less primary care, and experience higher
rates of hospitalisation, than any other group. This could change
if Commonwealth and state governments could agree on a
workable role definition, resolve the arguments about who pays
for what, and implement a new approach in partnership with
communities.

In all of the options above, we
suggest that there must be the
option for better regional
coordination and planning of
health care delivery. The
questions of the size of regions, and their relationship to state boundaries, vary under various
options. Regions could carry specified accountability and budgets for national policy priority
areas (like mental health).
Strengthen primary health care and improve the integration of ‘health’ and ‘aged’ care
There is a critical need to strengthen primary health care. Likewise, there is an urgent need
for better integration in the planning and financing of ‘health’ and ‘aged’ care to stop the cost
and blame shifting that now occurs and to improve the coordination of care for those with
chronic health needs. These two problems need fixing under any option. See Attachment 3
for a more detailed discussion of the impact of the options for primary health care.
Change is a process
Change should be staged, and higher level enabling measures should be put in place first, so
that those closer to patient care and community needs are supported to enhance the
effectiveness of their work, while also being able to continue care delivery with a minimum of
disruption.
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Scope
There are important problems with defining the scope of health and aged care reform –
problems of policy and the problem of current jurisdictional variations in the scope their health
or human service portfolios. The policy problem is that, for example, services for people with
disability and for families and children need their own high level focus, and can suffer from
being ‘bundled up’ with the relatively larger health and aged care sector.
Currently, jurisdictions vary widely in their portfolio arrangements. Victoria, Tasmania and the
Northern Territory have existing broader boundaries on their human service authorities –
including variously housing, family and community services. Similarly, ambulance services
are not included in the health portfolio in some states, but rather in emergency services.
Likewise, prison health services may be part of the health portfolio or part of the justice
portfolio.
Jurisdictions may choose to take the opportunity of health and aged care reform to realign
portfolios. However, requirements for portfolio changes can be largely avoided in all options
(the national Joint Health Commission is perhaps the exception, but we have rejected this
option for this and other reasons). The departments with larger scope already manage
multiple joint agreements and the equivalent of this arrangement could continue.

Private and non-government sectors
This paper raises several issues of relevance to the private and non-government sectors, in
particular, their roles in providing health and aged care, and possibly in acting as contracted
purchasers. In this section, we briefly address the implications for the private and nongovernment sectors, noting that the Commission has commissioned a separate paper which
canvasses existing and potential roles for the private sector more fully.
Private health insurance (PHI)
The role of PHI does not need to change under any of the options. However, the NHHRC is
separately considering the role of PHI and, in that context, there are a number of possibilities.
One option is the potential for PHI to act as purchaser/commissioner for its members on some
form of ‘cash out’ basis, for example, the funding of care packages for identified patient
groups in relation to chronic and complex care. As noted above, such an approach would be
possible under all of the options in this paper.
Private hospitals
The role of private hospitals is not necessarily changed by any of the options, but under all
options, private hospitals could become more involved in providing care for public patients or
for responding to contracting opportunities to provide a broader range of care.
Non government organisations
There is an enormous array of non-government organisations involved in health care
provision, from large national church-based hospital groups to local support services for those
with a specific condition. Their roles are not necessarily changed by any of the options, but
more effective commissioning and transparency of funding will enhance their opportunity to
participate and to contribute to local health solutions involving new models of care. In
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addition, better tendering and contract management practices have the potential to improve
both efficiency and responsiveness of the care provided by NGOs.
Chronic and Complex Care
As we have already noted, the current health system works well for episodic care, but less so
for those with complex chronic conditions. Most of the solutions lie outside hospitals and
many involve private and non-government providers. Under all options, there is potential for
private and non-government providers to take on care coordination roles for an enrolled
population.
Private Sector Participation in System Governance
Under the current arrangements, while private providers and funders are a major part of the
health system, they do not have a place at the table in national governance forums such as
AHMC or COAG. These groups are rather regarded as stakeholders who need to be
managed through the political process. Private/non-government health and aged care entities
primarily relate to the system governance structures as lobbyists, and as industry and
professional associations.
Priority areas for system redesign include care coordination outside hospitals as well as the
creation of an effective interface between hospital and community based care.
Commonwealth/state arrangements cannot address the care delivery aspects of these
changes, as the community based providers are largely private. The private sector needs to
play an active role in system redesign, and it could be argued that it therefore needs a larger
role in system governance.
The various structural options outlined in this paper assume that with the separation of
commissioning and delivery there will be greater opportunities for local participation and
integration by private providers at the local level.
The question remains as to whether there should be provision in national, state and regional
governance arrangements for these private participants (provider organisations, professional
associations, industry bodies and private health insurers) to contribute their expertise. In
Germany, for example, the Concerted Action model seeks to engage all participants in the
reform process (Gross, 2008).
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Conclusions: Can we get there from here?
We have outlined the problems, assumptions, principles and design considerations which
formed the basis of our thinking, and have outlined four distinct feasible options.
We have not expressed a view about which is the best option, and to do so is not our role.
However, we have reflected long and hard about the major problems to be solved, the
potential for change, and the attendant risks. We would offer the following thoughts for
consideration by those who will make decisions about these critical matters.
1. System design is not a set of free choices
Elements must be aligned: policies, funding arrangements, skills, roles and accountabilities
come as a linked set, and each element affects all the other elements in sometimes
unpredictable ways. The need for change arises precisely because of the current lack of such
alignment. Whatever is done in future must achieve better alignment and cannot run the risk
of being perceived as just a continuation of business as usual.
2. Incrementalism is an enduring feature of Australian public policy
The most achievable pathway may be what we have called the renovation option. It could be
adopted explicitly as a transitional arrangement, and we have attempted to outline the main
features in a way that would enable this strategy. However, we cannot honestly suggest that
the continuation of the kind of split responsibility the system currently endures is a platform for
improved accountability and more effective governance. If this option is adopted, it should
include provision to begin experimenting with integrated responsibility for those sectors of
care which most urgently require change, that is, improvement in health care for Indigenous
Australians, and ongoing care for people with complex and chronic conditions.
3. Whatever the governance option, there is room for simplification in the current
plethora of funding programs at all levels of government
This could be undertaken through sophisticated methods of harmonising payment
arrangements regardless of source. The same harmonisation strategy could be adopted for
accelerating changes to reporting and information sharing arrangements. That is, change
could happen in the funding and information management ‘back room’ that would move the
blame- and cost-shifting borders away from patients and care providers and minimise, if not
resolve, the care delivery problems they cause.
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Attachment 1: Technical Issues
As well as setting out two primary questions for this paper, the National Health and Hospitals
Reform Commission asked us to consider a number of technical issues, only some of which
we have addressed above. We give further brief responses to each below.

1. Purchasing
The Commission noted that ‘the purchasing function is relatively poorly developed and to the
extent that it exists, has been associated with the evolution of more sophisticated ways of
funding (eg through casemix funding arrangements) with attention to more detailed
specification of the range of services to be purchased being limited to some specialised
areas. The paper should identify whether a more sophisticated purchasing function should be
encouraged to evolve in Australia and if so, what might be the benefits of this policy direction,
the feasibility of this and impediments to the development of such a strategy. The options
paper should also identify the merits or otherwise of a clearer separation of
funding/purchasing and provision in the Australian health system.’
We have addressed the commissioning function in the body of this paper. In relation to
technical purchasing options, it is not currently feasible to replicate the sophisticated definition
and costing of hospital episodes in other parts of the health system. Even if a significant
development investment is made tomorrow, it would be many years before an episode-based
(rather than item-based) classification and costing system would be possible. That said, we
note that health authorities working with providers have developed sophisticated service
models and used them as the basis for payment regimes in areas of policy focus, including
mental health and disability care. Other opportunities have been lost, including the potential to
gather more useful health intelligence from GP and specialist billing codes (eg the description
of services as ‘short’ ‘medium’ or ‘long’ consultation is no basis for developing an episode
based classification and funding model).
We suggest that better specification of funded care, and better information about utilisation of
services, should be pursued selectively, where technical means and policy importance
combine to provide opportunity for benefit.

2. Funding for accountability
The Commission suggested that there are two broad choices in methods of funding for
accountability: ‘to emphasise area funding or activity-based funding (or both). Some
canvassing of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach should be undertaken. Here
the paper needs to consider issues both in terms of how public sector services might be best
structured, but also structures, governance and accountability arrangements might evolve in
the context of so-called ‘funds pooling’ options.’
This paper has focused on arrangements for the governance and accountability of
government, rather than providers of care. We suggest that both area or population-based
funding and activity-based funding are important and valid methods for accountability, and
that the choice of method depends on the policy goal, the level at which the funding is flowing
and the alignment of the delivery system. For example, area-based funding is more effective

29
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be taken to be the views of the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission or the Australian Government.

when one organisation has authority over most of the services in the area, or at least
coherent packages of services while activity-based funding is more appropriate for the
funding of specific services such as a hospital. While activity-based funding promotes
technical efficiency, population-based funding promotes allocative efficiency. For this reason,
models that contain elements of both, if well-designed, have the potential to contain the best
incentives.

3. Integration of organisational structures
‘States differ in terms of whether public institutional provision is integrated at an area level
and whether hospitals are organisationally distinct entities from other health services.
Discussion about the merit or otherwise of integrated organisational structures should be
included in the options paper.’
We are mindful of the extent to which restructuring of public health care institutions has been
a cyclical and very expensive exercise over the last 15 years. We also note that almost all
public sector organisations (ie the health authorities of most states and many organisations
within Victoria) are larger and/or operate with less effective delegation of operational authority
than the evidence from research on organisations indicates is feasible or desirable. We would
therefore suggest that restructuring of public health care organisations be undertaken only
when there is a strong basis of need to do so, and that it should move either in the direction of
reduction in size or enhancement of the strategy known as ‘divisionalising’ in large
corporations (ie operational autonomy for different product or service lines within a large
organisation). The general principle should be to decentralise what you can and only
centralise what you have to.

4. Breadth of health authority roles
‘Jurisdictions also differ in terms of the scope of their health authority’s responsibilities (e.g.
some ‘Human Services’ departments are responsible for much more than health services).
Although primarily determined by whole of government considerations as part of machinery of
government changes, some comment should be included in the options paper on whether a
broader range of functions has merit in terms of taking the claimed comprehensive view of
health and the range of appropriate health interventions, set against the added complexity of
management of the Department and span of control issues.’
We have briefly addressed this question in the section headed ‘Scope’.

5. The role of Boards
‘If a funder/purchaser versus provider split is proposed, the options paper should canvas
whether such a split necessitates the introduction of boards of directors of the provider
organisations. The strengths and weaknesses of boards in the health sector, their role, and
the nature of any autonomy that should be accorded to boards should be canvassed.’
Australia has had two types of boards, hospital and community health centre boards and area
health boards. Hospital and community health centre boards have been historically
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responsible for managing the budget allocated by government. Area health boards were
historically responsible for improving the health of residents in a designated geographic area
and, to that end, were also responsible for the management of health services. Area Health
Boards, particularly in NSW under the Area Health Services Act 1986, had real governance
authority and accountability. Movement away from models offering a measure of geographic
area responsibility and devolved funding (through a series of amalgamations) has occurred in
recent years (except in Victoria) because of perceived administrative and political difficulties
rather than health policy or efficiency concerns. Given the plethora of administrative changes
in recent years, we take the view that boards should only be reinstated with appropriate
authority guaranteed or in the fully realised form of corporatisation.
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Attachment 2: Improving equity of access to MBS and
PBS
While current fee for service arrangements work well for some, there is significant inequity
across the country in relation to geographic access to these schemes. These inequities
largely reflect the geographic maldistribution of the medical workforce, both between and
within states and territories. In this short attachment, we explore a single proposition – that is,
that better geographic equity of access to medical care could be achieved through a shift to
population needs-based funding while still using MBS and PBS as payment mechanisms.
This analysis does not address overall geographic equity, so that, while it appears from this
analysis that residents in some states use more MBS and PBS funded services than others,
analysis of other sectors of the health system (for example, hospitals and mental health
services) would produce different results.
Table 8 illustrates current inequities at the level of the states and territories. With average
benefits of $1,010 per person in 2007/08, NSW residents received $80 per year more benefits
from these two schemes than the national average. At the other extreme, NT residents
received $508 less. The differences are even more extreme when per capita benefits are
examined at the level of urban, regional and remote region of residence.
Table 8:
Jurisdiction

Per capita MBS and PBS funding by state and territory 2007/2008
MBS and PBS per capita

Per capita difference from national average

$1,010

$80

SA

$957

$27

VIC

$941

$11

TAS

$909

-$21

QLD

$892

-$38

WA

$787

-$143

ACT

$739

-$191

NT

$423

-$508

Australia

$930

$0

NSW

Source: Medicare Australia (MBS and PBS data) and ABS (population data)
In discussing the options for reform and renovation, we noted that needs-based funding to
regions is critical to achieving better geographic equity. This short attachment summarises
how this might be achieved.
It would be neither possible nor desirable to simply reduce MBS and PBS funding in NSW,
South Australia and Victoria and redistribute it to the other states. Both schemes are designed
to be universal schemes and Australians are entitled to access them wherever they live
(presuming that they are available). Further, there is no evidence to suggest that those states
enjoying benefits above the national average are ‘over-serviced’. Indeed, the Commission is
receiving significant input suggesting that increased investment in primary care will be
required to meet Australia’s future needs.
Instead, achievement of geographic equity whether via regional HFAs or by other means will
require increased investment over time. While regional HFAs would initially be established by
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cashing out the region’s current level of benefits (with the majority of funds continuing to be
paid as fee-for-service benefits through MBS and PBS), funding for those regions below
needs-adjusted per capita share would gradually be increased (potentially over some years)
to an equitable level.
Table 9 illustrates the potential cost of increasing per capita benefits across the country to the
level of that enjoyed in NSW. In total, MBS and PBS benefits would need to increase by $1.7
billion or 8.6%. This represents an increase in total health spending of around 1.8%, which is
well within the growth rate in health expenditure experienced in recent years. It is thus a
feasible option. It is important to note that any actual adjustments would be balanced by
adjustments in expenditures on other programs, which may also account for some of the
variability between states in population take up of MBS and PBS. Also, within-state variations
are in many cases more significant, and will need to be addressed at regional level under any
option if equity of access is to be improved.
Table 9:
Jurisdiction

Investment required to achieve equity (unadjusted for need) between
the states in MBS and PBS funding (2007/08 dollars)
$ required to increase MBS and PBS to NSW level

% increase

$0

0%

SA

$84,125,206

5.5%

VIC

$359,910,356

7.3%

TAS

$49,767,845

11.0%

QLD

$496,545,915

13.2%

WA

$473,919,055

28.2%

ACT

$92,209,318

36.6%

$127,777,533

139.0%

$1,686,577,811

8.6%

NSW

NT
Australia

Within their regional allocation, each HFA would be required to continue to cover the costs of
universal access to both the MBS and the PBS for their residents. This is essential to
maintain the rights of citizens to access these services. But if a region is underspent (e.g,
because of the undersupply of doctors and other health professionals in rural and outer
metropolitan areas), the HFA could enter into arrangements to develop new models of care
that substitute for the underspending. Conversely, regions with high utilisation of MBS/PBS
could potentially be underfunded for these service levels, but only if growth in MBS and PBS
funding is not maintained.
Either way, there would be no requirement for the HFA to ‘silo’ their MBS or PBS funding. The
HFA will have access to a global allocation for their region’s residents that includes not only
MBS and PBS funding but also, for example, funding for hospital and other services. Within
this global allocation, the HFA is charged with responsibility for funding the range of services
required to meet the health needs of their residents. In doing so, they will need to take
account of population need, the requirement to maintain the universality of Medicare, the
range and mix of services already in place, opportunities for service substitution and new
models of care.
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Attachment 3: What the options mean for primary
health care
This section provides just one example (primary health care) to illustrate what the options
mean in practice. Primary health care services are first point of contact services that do not
require a referral from another health professional. They include, but are not limited to, GPs,
community health, home and community care, maternal and child health, community mental
health, aged care assessment teams, aboriginal community-controlled health services,
dentisty, optometry, other allied health services.
Under Option 1, primary health care services would be funded and either reimbursed or
commissioned by the Commonwealth. Under Option 2, primary health care services would be
funded from a funding pool that includes both Commonwealth and state contributions, but
they would be reimbursed or commissioned by the state. Under Option 3, they would also be
funded from a funding pool that includes both Commonwealth and state contributions but
would be reimbursed or commissioned by a joint Health Commission. Under all options,
individual out-of-packet payments for services would continue to apply, unless alternative
decisions were made to allocate public funding or change health insurance scope.
To successfully meet Australia’s future needs, the level/s of government given responsibility
for primary health care services in the future will need (among other challenges) to:


increase the size and mix of the primary health care workforce



achieve a more equitable geographic distribution of the primary health care workforce



develop and implement funding models that achieve the right balance between fee for
service, capitation, salary, funding for capacity and funding for performance



use available incentives and levers to achieve better planning, coordination and
integration of primary health care services



use available incentives and levers to achieve better linkages between primary health
care services and other parts of the health system, including incentives to keep the
population healthy and thus reduce reliance on acute care hospitals and residential care.

These challenges are summarised in Table 10 along with brief comments about the options
set out in this paper.
Table 10:

Reform priorities for primary health care

Challenge

Comment

Workforce

Attention to future workforce supply and roles is needed regardless of the option.
There is no evidence to suggest that any particular option will better support
workforce supply and distribution. However, the Commonwealth has the deepest
pocket and the best opportunity to shape the volume and mix of health
professionals graduating from Australian universities

Equity

The states have a better (although somewhat patchy) track record on this issue.
Needs-based funding to regions is critical to achieving better equity regardless of
the structural option

Funding models

While there is no doubt an ongoing place for fee for service payments, it is equally
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Challenge

Comment
true that fee for service alone is not an adequate funding model for primary health
care. There are opportunities under all options for better blended and mixed
payment models similar to those in place in other countries (eg, the funding of
New Zealand Primary Health Organisations)

Planning and
coordination within
primary health
care

More comprehensive, and more effective, local solutions are required. All
integration is local and thus regional structures are essential, regardless of the
structural option. The states have a better (but again somewhat patchy) track
record on this issue.

Planning and
coordination with
other parts of the
health system

This requires both effective funding levers and local planning and coordination
structures and processes. There are opportunities under all options that involve
regional HFAs for better planning and coordination of services on a regional and
local basis. It is doubtful that this could be achieved under any of the centralised
options

As this brief summary illustrates, a change in the corporate governance of the health system
(regardless of the option selected) will not, by itself, solve the problems confronting primary
health care, just as none of the options immediately solve the problems confronting other
sectors. Each of the options creates opportunities (in different ways) to removes barriers, set
directions and change the way that resources are allocated. The key question is to design the
governance structure that is most likely to allow these challenges to be addressed.
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